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The Goucher decision highlights the need for placing a financial
exigency provision in the faculty tenure agreements of a college or
university.6' If an institution wishes to modify existing tenure contracts
to include a financial exigency provision, Goucher suggests that such a
provision may be placed in the school's by-laws as a codification of a pre-
existing, yet unwritten, contract term.62 The abrogation of tenure rights,
however, should be permitted only as a last resort in order to maintain a
viable educational program.e The unfavorable economic prospects for
higher education are generating increasing tension between the faculties
and administrations of American colleges and universities.6 4 The Fourth
Circuit's decision in Goucher may have the effect of accelerating the
current trend towards collective bargaining in higher education.6 5
JAMES S. MCNEDER, ImI
XI. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Substantive, Procedural and Remedial Issues in Title VII
Litigation
Persons aggrieved by racial discrimination in private employment
may sue for relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' In
note 17 supra, was properly upheld by the Fourth Circuit because funding appellants eco-
nomics education would only exacerbate the college's financial troubles.
See note 6 supra.
62 See 585 F.2d at 679-80.
63 See Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945, 950 (D. Neb. 1974).
64 See Tucker, supra note 6, at 113.
" See text accompanying note 42 supra.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) [hereinafter cited as Title VII]. Title VII prohibits discrimi-
nation based upon race, color, religion, sex or national origin by public employers, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(h) (1976), labor organizations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d) (1976), or private businesses
having fifteen or more employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). A claimant proceeding under
Title VII first must file an administrative charge of discrimination with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(1976). A claimant may sue under Title VII only if he receives a notice of his right to sue from
the EEOC. Local 179, United Textile Wkrs. v. Federal Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849, 851
(8th Cir. 1972). The EEOC issues a notice of the right to sue if the administrative charge is
dismissed, if conciliation discussions with the defendant are terminated, or if the EEOC has
not filed a civil suit within 180 days of the filing of the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Once
the plaintiff receives his right to sue notice, he has ninety days within which to file suit in
federal district court. Id. See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972).
Victims of racial discrimination in public and private employment may also seek redress
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). See Long v. Ford Motor Co., 352 F. Supp. 135, 140 (E.D. Mich.
1972), modified on other grounds, 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974). Section 1981 grants to "[aIll
persons" within the United States the same rights to "make and enforce contracts" as are
enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). Title VII and § 1981 are distinct and
independent causes of action, see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461
(1975), and § 1981 plaintiffs enjoy several advantages not allowed Title VII claimants. A
plaintiff prodeeding under § 1981 alone or under both Title VII and § 1981 need not first
submit to the delay ridden administrative procedures of the EEOC. Id. Back pay awards
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determining a plaintiff's rights under Title VII, trial courts must resolve
complex substantive, procedural and remedial questions.' Courts first
must ascertain the standards necessary to prove the plaintiffs theory of
racial discrimination. 3 Class actions pose the additional issues of whether
the named plaintiff is the proper class representative 4 and whether a bifur-
cated trial is proper.5 In fashioning the remedial decree, courts must ad-
dress the imposition of rigid racial quotas,' the extent of any classwide
back pay award,7 and the validity of provisions which displace or demote
non-minority employees.8 In Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., ' the Fourth
Circuit addressed these important issues in employment discrimination
litigation.
In Sledge, the named plaintiffs sued individually and on behalf of all
past and present black employees and unsuccessful job applicants at J.P.
Stevens' Roanoke Rapids textile plants."0 The plaintiffs alleged that Ste-
vens unlawfully discriminated in hiring, job assignments, promotions, lay-
off recalls and compensation." At the conclusion-of the non-jury trial, the
district court, finding that the named plaintiffs failed to prove that they
were victims of discrimination, dismissed their individual claims.'" The
court, however, allowed the named plaintiffs to remain as representatives
of the class. 3 The court then found that Stevens' reliance on the subjective
under § 1981 are not limited to two years prior to the filing of the EEOC charge as they are
in Title VII cases. Id. at 460; see note 117 infra. Furthermore, a plaintiff can obtain compensa-
tory and punitive damages under § 1981, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
at 460, but the weight of authority holds both to be unavailable under Title VII. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds 431
U.S. 951 (1977); Howard v. Lockheed-Ga. Co., 372 F. Supp. 854, 856 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Finally,
since § 1981 applies to all contractual relationships, it is potentially much broader than the
1964 Civil Rights Act which is limited to employment relationships. See Heiser, Intent v.
Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimi-
nation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16 SAN DIEGo L. Rav. 207, 213 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Heiser]. See generally Note, Title VI and 42 US. C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions, 10
U. RicH. L. REv. 339 (1976).
2 See generally Jones, Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications
of the New Law, 30 RUTGSRs L. Rsv. 1 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
See text accompanying notes 57-65 infra.
See text accompanying notes 66-81 infra.
See text accompanying notes 96-114 infra.'
See text accompanying notes 115-21 infra.
See text accompanying notes 122-29 infra.
585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
"Id. at 630. The Sledge plaintiffs brought suit under Title VII and § 1981. Id. at 631.
The trial court certified a class which included all blacks who were employed at any of J.P.
Stevens' Roanoke Rapidi, N.C. plants on or after October 2, 1967 and all blacks who applied
for employment at those plants subsequent to October 2, 1967 and who claimed to have been
affected by the challenged discriminatory employment practice. See Sledge v. J.P. Stevens
& Co., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,585, at 6438 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
" 585 F.2d at 631. The plaintiffs contended that while Stevens' employment practices
were not intentionally discriminatory, they disproportionately affected minorities. Id. at 635;
see note 24 infra.
12 585 F.2d at 631; 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,585, at 6417-21.
' 585 F.2d at 632; 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,585, at 6438. The Sledge district court
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opinions of white supervisors, its non-objective hiring guidelines, and its
failure to post vacancies affected disproportionately the hiring, promo-
tional and job assignment opportunities of blacks." The court enjoined all
racially discriminatory employment acts, omissions and practices;" or-
dered back pay to members of the class; and awarded reasonable attor-
ney's fees. 7 The remedial decree prescribed strict racial quotas for future
hiring, job placement, and promotions" and provided that departmental
seniority for blacks be replaced by a constructive seniority system. 9 On
characterized the Fourth Circuit practice of allowing dismissed plaintiffs to continue as class
representatives as "[a In apparent anomaly in practice and procedure in employment dis-
crimination class actions. ... Id.
'1 585 F.2d at 632; 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,585, at 6421-36. Based upon comparisons of
hiring figures of blacks and whites from May, 1969 to June 30, 1972 which showed a steadily
decreasing hiring rate for blacks, the court found that the defendant had discriminated in
hiring new employees. Id. at 6423. The district court further found that Stevens' policies had
the effect of reserving certain job categories for whites and other categories for blacks. The
court placed particular emphasis on the minimal number of blacks in clerical jobs, supervi-
sory positions and skilled occupations which paid the highest wages. Id. at 6424-25. Racial
disparities in pay rates among all male employees and male employees with comparable
employment qualifications also helped to confirm discriminatory employment practices. Id.
at 6426-32. The court further based its findings of discrimination on Stevens' department
seniority system for layoffs and recalls which effectively continued discriminatory hiring
practices and department assignments. Id. at 6435-36. Finally, the court found that the
waiting period from application for employment to actual hiring was almost twice as long for
black females as white females. Id. at 6436.
1 585 F.2d at 632; 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,047, at 4877 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (remedial
decree provisions issued in separate opinion).
11 585 F.2d at 633; 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,585, at 6439. The district court limited the
back pay award in Sledge to a period beginning three years prior to the institution of the class
action suit. The district court concluded that the North Carolina Statute of Limitations, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (1977), governed back pay awards in both Title VII and § 1981 litigation.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 115-22 infra.
'1 585 F.2d at 633; 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,585, at 6439. In Title VII litigation, attorney's
fees are awarded to the prevailing party at the trial court's discretion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1976). Prevailing parties may also recover attorney's fees in § 1981 litigation. 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1976). See generally Employment Discrimination, Fourth Circuit Review, 36 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 443, 454-58 (1979). When the plaintiff prevails in employment discrimination
litigation, attorney's fees must be awarded unless special circumstances are present. See
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978). However, district courts
may only award legal expenses to prevailing defendants if the plaintiff's suit was "frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Id.
at 421. See generally Heinsz, Attorneys Fees for Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a
Workable Standard, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 259 (1977). Because the discretion of the trial court
governs both the awarding and amount of attorney's fees, such an award should not be
reversed on appeal unless the trial judge clearly abused his discretion. See Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1972), rehearing denied, 471 F.2d 650 (5th Cir.
1973); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp.', 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971).
' 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,047, at 4878-83; see note 94 infra.
" 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,047, at 4879-81. The district court directed Stevens to insti-
tute a system which computes the black employee's constructive seniority by adjusting his
application date by the average waiting period of white applicants during the year the black
employee sought employment. Id. at 4880. The district court also prescribed job bidding and
red circling provisions. Job bidding is a system whereby the employer posts job vacancies and
the employee submits his name for consideration. The vacancy is filled by the best qualified
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appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Stevens contended that the trial court impro-
perly allowed the class action to proceed after dismissal of the named
plaintiffs' individual claims,'2 erroneously found that Stevens had engaged
in discriminatory employment practices, 2' and abused its discretion in the
provisions of the remedial decree.
2
1
In assessing Stevens' Title VII liability, the Fourth Circuit applied the
disparate impact test promulgated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. 2 Under the disparate impact test, proof of discriminatory
employment practices does not require a showing of discriminatory intent,
but merely a showing that an employer's facially neutral policies dispro-
portionately affected minorities. 2 A three step analysis governs the proof
bidder or, in the event of equal qualifications, by the employee with the most plant seniority.
Id. at 4881. Red circling permits blacks to change jobs or departments without suffering a
decrease in pay. Once the black employee transfers, he continues to earn his old wage rate
and receives general increases applicable to that rate until such time as more pay may be
earned in the new job classification. Id. at 4882.
In fashioning its remedial decree, the district court imposed "bumping" provisions.
Under these provisions, any black employee who is about to be laid off, is entitled to "bump"
any other employee with less plant seniority if the job of the junior employee can be performed
with reasonable training. Id. at 4883; see text accompanying notes 122-29 infra.
21 585 F.2d at 633; see text accompanying notes 64-65 infra.
21 585 F.2d at 633; see text accompanying notes 29-34 infra.
2 585 F.2d at 633; see text accompanying notes 93-114 infra. The plaintiffs in Sledge
cross-appealed, challenging the dismissal of their individual claims and the claim filing
requirements necessary to collect back pay. 585 F.2d at 633. Plaintiffs also contested the
limitation of Stevens' liability for back pay to a period beginning three years prior to the filing
of the class action. Id.
- 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the employer required candidates seeking to transfer
to skilled line jobs to either pass two standardized intelligence tests or have a high school
education. Id. at 427-28. The Court found that these requirements, while not purposefully
discriminatory, had the effect of rendering ineligible a disproportionate number of black
transfer applicants. The Court held that the disparate impact of this employment practice
established h prima facie violation of Title VII and that the requirements were not "job
related." Id. at 431-36. Since Griggs, the Supreme Court has applied the disparate impact,
or "effects," test in several cases, see, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), and has affirmed
the use of the test in Title VII actions most recently in New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979).
Prior to Griggs, recovery for discrimination was difficult because of the formidable task
of proving discriminatory intent. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59, 70 (1973). How-
ever, since the institution of the disparate impact test as the prevailing liability standard,
courts have found violations of Title VII in numerous cases that previously would not have
been provable. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (disparate impact of
minimum height and weight requirements); Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (disparate impact of disqualifying employment applicants with more than one
wage garnishment).
24 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Disparate impact cases are
distinguishable from disparate treatment cases. In the former, the employment practices are
facially neutral in their treatment of minority groups but in fact affect more adversely the
interests of these minorities. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n.15 (1977). Disparate treatment, by contrast, involves practices which on their face
treat some individuals less favorably than others because of their religion, sex, national origin
or color. Proof of discriminatory intent is essential. Id.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and
1980]
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of disparate impact claims.2 5 The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
by showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying equal
employment opportunities to members of a protected class.26 The defen-
dant may rebut this prima facie case by proof that its employment prac-
tices are job related." If the employer's rebuttal succeeds, the plaintiff still
may establish liability by suggesting alternative selection techniques




In Sledge, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
plaintiffs may use statistical evidence to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination .2 The panel further ruled that when a statisti-
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), most
courts considering the issue held that § 1981, like Title VII, did not require proof of discrimi-
natory intent. See Heiser, supra note 1, at 221. Subsequent to those decisions, however, many
courts reevaluated their position and held that the plaintiff must prove discriminatory motive
to establish a § 1981 prima facie case. See Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2, 2-3 (5th
Cir. 1978); City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 1976). For a good discus-
sion of the merits of this issue see Heiser, supra note 1, at 221-48; Note, Burden of Proof in
Racial Discrimination Actions Brought Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1870: Dispro-
portionate Impact or Discriminatory Purpose?, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1030, 1043-58.
21 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
26 Id.; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Plaintiffs proceeding under the disparate impact
test must show a pattern or practice of discrimination in order to establish a prima facie Title
VII violation. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335. A single
instance of discrimination, even though directly traceable to a particular employment prac-
tice, does not establish a pattern or practice of discrimination and thus may not be adjudi-
cated under the effects test. See Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 234-35 (N.D.
Cal. 1976). See generally Hsia, The Effects Test: New Directions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
777, 780-82 (1977).
" See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). In the Fourth
Circuit, employment practices are job related if an overriding business purpose exists which
is essential to the safe and efficient operation of the business. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). In order to rebut a
Title VII prima facie case, a particular policy must carry out effectively the business purpose
it purportedly serves, be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact and be the least
discriminatory alternative for accomplishing the business purpose advanced. Id. See
generally Note, Employment Testing and Proof of Job Relatedness: A Tale of Unreasonable
Constraints, 52 NOTRaa DAME LAW. 95 (1976); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
21 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
" 585 F.2d at 635. Statistics alone may be used to establish a prima facie case of employ-
ment discrimination. See New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979). While
statistical proof of disparities between blacks and whites are compelling, plaintiffs must
direct their charges of discrimination to specific employment practices. See Harper v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Harper
v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973). Mere evidence of a racially imbalanced workforce
is insufficient to establish liability under Title VII. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977); Lewis v. Tobacco Wkrs. Int'l Union, 577 F.2d
1135, 1141 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 439 U.S. 1089
(1979).
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cal demonstration of disparate impact accompanies evidence that the de-
fendant bases his employment decisions on the subjective opinions of white
supervisors, a court need not assess the independent sufficiency of the
statistics but may infer that the defendant sanctioned racially discrimina-
tory employment practices.3 1 Since Stevens based all its hiring and promo-
tional decisions on subjective opinions, the panel concluded that the plain-
tiffs had established a prima facie case of illegal discrimination.3' The
defendant offered no evidence that these employment practices were job
related, but asserted the consistent increase in the percentage of blacks in
its work-force during the period in controversy as its only defense." The
panel characterized this defense as irrelevant to the issue of liability in a
disparate impact suit3 and held that Stevens' promotional, hiring and job
assignment practices violated Title VIIY3
The Fourth Circuit's approach to subjective employment criteria is
consistent with the majority of circuits that have considered the issue.
35
Although prior to Sledge no court had stated expressly that statistical
disparities combined with subjectivity in hiring or promotions automati-
cally establish a prima facie case of Title VII liability, the majority of
circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, had held that subjective employ-
ment criteria constituted strong additional evidence of discrimination.36
Since every case dealing with subjective employment practices has ulti-
mately found the overall evidence sufficient to establish the defendants'
liability,37 the Sledge court's express creation of a presumption of discrimi-
nation is the de jure expression of a de facto rule. Title VII plaintiffs should
be able to establish liability more easily because under this presumption
even statistically insignificant disparities may be used in proving disparate
impact.3
" 585 F.2d at 635. Subjective employment criteria are used to infer discrimination in
Title VII cases because of their capacity for masking racial bias. See Parson v. Kaiser Alumn.
& Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1384-85 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2417 (1979);
Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing and Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972). See generally Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Deci-
sions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REV. 737 (1976).
3' 585 F.2d at 635.
32 Id. at 636. Stevens offered no business necessity justification in the district court
proceeding, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. T 10,585, at 6439, and advanced none in its brief submitted
to the Fourth Circuit, see Brief for the Defendant at 16, Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585
F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978).
m 585 F.2d at 636. See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v.'United States, 431 U.S.
324, 341-42 (1977). An increase in the percentage of blacks in an employer's work force during
the controverted period is relevant to the fashioning of remedial decrees. See text accompany-
ing note 101 infra.
3 585 F.2d at 636.
23 See, e.g., Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1349 (8th Cir.), vacated
on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358-59
(5th Cir. 1972).
31 See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975); United States
v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 368 (8th Cir. 1973).
7 See notes 35 & 36 supra.
3 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
1980]
610 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
Although plaintiffs generally can establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination through a showing of disparate impact, section 703(h) of Title
VIIP5 creates an exception for seniority systems which are bona fide and not
purposely discriminatory." Section 703(h), however, is a narrow exception
which does not protect employment practices peripherally related to the
operation of a seniority system.4 Thus, when an entire promotional system
is intertwined with a seniority system, section 703(h) protects only the
seniority provisions."
In Sledge, the panel reversed the district court's finding that Stevens'
departmental seniority system violated Title VII.43 The Fourth Circuit has
ruled that a seniority system is bona fide if it applies equally to all employ-
ees and was negotiated and maintained free of any discriminatory ani-
mus." The fact that a bona fide seniority system perpetuates the effects
of pre-Act discrimination is insufficient to create Title VII liability.45 Be-
cause the plaintiffs did not challenge the bona fides of Stevens' system,"
the panel concluded that the defendants were not liable for the discrimina-
tion inherent in the operation of that system.47
The Fourth Circuit's standard for determining a bona fide seniority
system accords with other circuits. The Supreme Court has not defined
specifically a bona fide seniority system. The Court, however, has ap-
proved as bona fide a seniority system which applied equally to all employ-
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)'(1976) [hereinafter cited as § 703(h)].
10 Id.; see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977).
Section 703(h) does not protect seniority systems which are the product of intentional dis-
crimination, even if that discrimination occurred prior to the effective date of Title VII. Id.
at 353. The immunization of "bona fide" seniority systems from the other requirements of
Title VII only applies to systems that perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination. Id.
The Supreme Court in Teamsters did not define a "bona fide" seniority system and thus left
to the lower courts the development of their own standards. See Firefighters Inst. for Racial
Equality v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235, 242 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3096
(1979) (system of basing promotions on seniority begun after commencement of Title VII
litigation not bona fide); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 352-53 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978) (company's unlawful employment practices and
adherence to segregationist policies during collective bargaining considered in determining
whether seniority system is bona fide); text accompanying note 48 infra.
" See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1978).
42 Id. See Parson v. Kaiser Alumn. & Chem. Co., 583 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir. 1978) (10
day bottom entry requirement held to be condition upon transfer rather than part of depart-
mental seniority system).
13 585 F.2d at 636. Stevens' departmental seniority system related to layoffs and recalls,
but not to promotions. Id. Under this system, seniority is based on the amount of time a
particular employee has worked in a department. Any transfer from one department to
another results in the forfeiture of accumulated seniority. 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,585, at
6435.
" See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1978); 585 F.2d at
635; note 40 supra.
4 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977).
40 585 F.2d at 636; see Brief for the Plaintiff at 44, Seldge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d
625 (4th Cir. 1978).
"7 585 F.2d at 636.
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ees, was maintained free of discriminatory purpose, accorded with industry
practice and NLRB precedent, and did not have its genesis in racial dis-
crimination." While these characteristics have provided an analytical base
for lower courts,49 the Supreme Court has given no guidance concerning
which of these specific elements are required and the relative weight to be
accorded to each element. The Fourth Circuit, in Sledge, adopted the
"totality of the circumstances" approach in which these elements are con-
sidered as a whole to assess the presence of discriminatory intent in the
seniority system."
The Fourth Circuit's approach, however, differs from that adopted by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The EEOC not only
examines the circumstances surrounding adoption of the seniority system
in determining bona fides, but also presumes discriminatory intent in two
situations." If an employer institutes a departmental seniority system
when departments have been segregated in the past, discriminatory pur-
pose is presumed.5 Similarly, the EEOC implies discriminatory animus
when an employer knows that his departmental seniority system has the
effect of preventing minority advancement, yet the system is maintained
in the face of other non-discriminatory alternatives.53 Although the facts
of Sledge fell into the latter situation, 4 the panel nevertheless held Ste-
vens' seniority system to be bona fide. 5  This sub silentio rejection of the
EEOC guidlines makes it more difficult for Title VII plaintiffs to success-
fully challenge a seniority system, but is consistent with the Supreme
Court's strict construction of section 703(h). The Fourth Circuit's interpre-
tation of the seniority system exemption as only a narrow exception to
Title VII standards," however, helps to ameliorate this potentially harsh
result. By strictly limiting the applicability of section 703(h), the Fourth
Circuit reconciled the competing interests of protecting seniority rights
and the elimination of discriminatory effects in employment.
After the Sledge court found Stevens liable for class-wide violations of
Title VII,57 it reversed the trial court's dismissal of the named plaintiffs'
claims. 8 In Title VII class action suits, plaintiffs must satisfy all of the
" See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355-56 (1977).
' See James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 351-52 (5th Cir. 1977);
Sears v. Atchison, Top. & S.F. Ry., 454 F. Supp. 158, 177 (D. Kan. 1978).
10 See Note, Title VII in the Supreme Court: Equal Employment Opportunity Bows to
Seniority Rights, 1978 UTAH L. Rav. 249, 263. See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 64 (2d
Cir. 1978).
., EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 6500 (July 14, 1977).
52 Id.
53 Id.
5 See note 43 supra.
1 585 F.2d at 636. The plaintiffs did not challenge the bona fides of Stevens' seniority
system. Id.
11 See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1978); text accom-
panying notes 41 & 42 supra.
7 See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
585 F.2d at 638.
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prerequisites necessary for class certification." One of these prerequisites,
the designation of the proper class representative, poses particular prob-
lems in employment discrimination litigation." In order to be a class repre-
sentative, one must have identical interests in being free from job discrimi-
nation and have suffered injury in prescisely the same manner as class
members.6 ' Thus, named plaintiffs who are employed by the defendant
may not represent a class of unsuccessful job applicants .1 A plaintiff in-
jured by discriminatory practices in one department, however, may repre-
sent a class injured by similar practices in other departments of the same
facility. 3 Once the district court finds that the named plaintiffs qualify as
11 See East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977); Roman
v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1349 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc). In order to certify a suit as a class
action, the court must determine that the class is so numerous that joinder of all its members
is impracticable, common questions of law and fact exist as to the class, the claims of the
representative parties are typical of the class, and the representative parties will adequately
protect the interests of the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The district court must make the
certification "as soon as practicable after the commencement of an action." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1). This determination may be made on the pleadings, but often discovery and prelimi-
nary evidentiary hearings are employed. See Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th
Cir. 1973). If the court so chooses, the class certification may be conditional and thus subject
to amendment prior to a decision on the merits. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). The trial court's
failure to enter a class certification order results in implied certification on appeal if all the
parties and the court treated the suit as a class action. See Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
485 F.2d 441, 446-47 (5th Cir. 1973).
10 See generally Shawe, Processing the Explosion in Title VII Class Action Suits: Achiev-
ing Increased Compliance With Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 19 WM. & MARY L.
Rxv. 469 (1978).
61 See East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977); Hill v.
Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 271 (1979). Prior to
Rodriguez, many courts, in order to effectuate Title VIi's goal of eliminating employment
discrimination, relaxed the procedural requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and allowed
named plaintiffs to challenge all of an employer's discriminatory employment practices, even
though they had been injured by only one such practice. This approach is known as an
"across-the-board" class action. See Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340-41
(10th Cir. 1975); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547 (4th Cir. 1975). See also 3B
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE I 23.06-2, at 23-195 to 196.
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court ruled that since the named plaintiffs lacked the requi-
site qualifications for the positions they sought and were not victims of hiring discrimination,
they could not represent the class of unsuccessful job applicants. 431 U.S. at 404. The court
held that the plaintiffs were not members of the class and did not suffer the same injury as
class members. Id. at 403-04. Subsequent to Rodriguez, the Fourth Circuit reversed its pre-
vious allowance of "across-the-board" class actions and required that class representatives
possesses precisely the same injury and interest as class members. Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550
F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc). See generally Comment, Proper Scope of Repre-
sentation in Title VII Class Actions: A Comment on East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc.
v. Rodriguez, 13 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 175 (1978).
" See Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1979) (named plaintiffs denied
class representative status in hiring discrimination claims as they had never been denied
employment on basis of race).
93 Id. The Hill panel noted that employees in different departments of the same facility,
who are affected by the same employment practices have the same interests and have suffered
the same injuries. Id. The court concluded that East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodri-
guez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977), does not destroy the usefulness of the class action device by
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representatives and certifies the class," dismissal of the plaintiffs' individ-
ual claims will not destroy their representative status and the class action
may continue unimpeded. 5
Many courts have adopted a bifurcated approach in Title VII class
actions as a compromise between competing views as to the propriety of
using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) in these suits." Title VII
plaintiffs prefer to proceed under Rule 23(b)(2), which is restricted to
actions involving injunctive or declaratory relief, because no notice need
be sent to class members. 7 However, since back pay awards are common-
place in employment discrimination litigation, some courts have held that
individual questions are presented which require the class action to pro-
ceed under Rule 23(b)(3).6 In Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, due process
considerations demand that notice be given each individual class mem-
ber.69 Since the plaintiffs must bear the cost of sending such notice, 0 prose-
cution of class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) has a chilling effect on employ-
ment discrimination suits.7 Faced with this dilemma, most courts have
held that the back pay award is merely one element of the total equitable
relief rather than a claim for damages, and therefore Rule 23(b) (2) should
requiring "separate suits on an episodic basis." 596 F.2d at 102. However, the court further
held that a named representative may not represent a class which has suffered the same
injuries, but is employed at different facilities. Id. The Hill panel noted that while all the
employees at the several Western Electric plants involved in the litigation lived in the same
geographical area, they are not drawn from the same labor market and thus are not employed
at the same facility. The job requirements of some of the departments require skilled workers,
while other departments do not. Id.; cf. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257,
266 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976), modified on rehearing, 586 F.2d 300 (4th Cir.
1978) (separate plants considered as single facility because located in same geographical area
and employed only unskilled workers).
" See note 62 supra.
, See, e.g., East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406 n.12
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 753 (1976). When the class has not been
certified, the dismissal of the named plaintiffs' claims should be considered in deciding
whether they should remain as class representatives. See East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc.
v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 406 n.12.
i See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1973). See
generally, Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class Actions: Problems of Procedure,
8 GA. L. REv. 781, 797-807 (1974); Davidson, Back Pay Awards Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 26 RUTGERs L. REv. 741, 750 (1973); Comment, The Class Action and Title
VII-An Overview, 10 U. RICH. L. Ray. 325, 337-38 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Class Action].
£7 See Class Action, supra note 66, at 336. Rule 23(b)(2) was amended during the 1966
Revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically to make it more conducive to
use in employment discrimination suits. See Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 23, 28
U.S.C., at 7766-67 (1970).
' See, e.g., Alexander v. AVCO Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (6th
Cir. 1977), modified on appeal, 565 F.2d 1364, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Bormann v.
Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 379 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
1' See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 23, 28 U.S.C., at 7768
(1970).
To See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
;' See Wetzel, v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 253 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
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be used in Title VII litigation." An increasing number of courts, however,
have adopted the bifurcated trial as a means of satisfying due process
requirements without deterring employment discrimination suits.
7 3
Under the bifurcated trial procedure, the first, or liability, stage pro-
ceeds under Rule 23(b)(2), while the remedial stage incorporates the notice
aspects of Rule 23(b)(3).74 In the liability stage, the court determines
whether the defendant utilized illegal employment practices. 75 If the court
finds the employer liable for class-wide Title VII violations, individual
employment decisions are presumed to have been tainted and each class
member thus is entitled to compensation. 7 In the remedial stage of the
trial, a three part process is used to calculate individual back pay awards.
7
Each individual must affirmatively establish his membership in the class
by showing that he is a member of the protected class and that, for exam-
ple, during the controverted period he sought employment with the defen-
dant and was not hired.78 The claimant must also provide any requested
information necessary to determine his specific financial loss caused by the
discrimination. 79 In response, an employer may demonstrate by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the individual class member was not em-
ployed because of a lawful consideration." If the employer carries this
71 See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir. 1971).
,3 See note 66 supra.
11 See Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9798, at 6339 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
5 585 F.2d at 637; see text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
7 585 F.2d at 637.
7 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361-62 (1977). If
the individual claimant sustains his claim in the remedial stage, his back pay claim will be
denied only for reasons which would not frustrate the legislative purposes of Title VII. See
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975). Although this standard creates a
presumption in favor of awarding back pay, such an award is not mandatory. Id. at 415. Back
pay is an equitable remedy left to the discretion of the trial court. Id. at 415-16. Once back
pay is awarded, the amount of the award may be reduced by the amounts the claimant earned
during the period in question or received in unemployment compensation. See Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Dec. 13, 15 (S.D. Fla. 1972). The award also may be
reduced by the amount the claimant could have earned with "reasonable diligence." Id.
11 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977). In
Sledge, the district court ordered a copy of the back pay order and a back pay questionnaire
and claim form sent to each class member. 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,251, at 5782. The back
pay questionnaire and claim form asked whether the individual claimed that Stevens failed
to hire, place or promote him on the basis of race. The form also asked if the claimant would
submit to questions by attorneys or the court. 585 F.2d at 633 n.10. If a class member did
not affirmatively express a desire to be included in the back pay award and supply the
necessary information, he waived his entitlement. Id. at 633. The Fourth Circuit affirmed this
claim filing procedure, holding it to be an appropriate first step towards ultimate resolution
of all back pay claims. Id. at 652.
"' See United Transp. Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
11 See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773 n.32 (1976). Demonstrations by an employer that some factor
other than race was responsible for the decision attacked must be made by a preponderence
of the evidence. 585 F.2d at 637. Examples of such exculpatory reasons are no job vacancies
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burden, the court will deny the back pay award unless the claimant can
demonstrate that the lawful factor asserted by the employer was a "mere
pretense."'"
In Sledge, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of
the named plaintiffs' individual claims during the liability stage of the
bifurcated process. 2 The panel held that although dismissal at that point
was not error per se, only two situations justify such a course of action.,
Dismissal is proper, the court ruled, if the evidence introduced at the
liability stage conclusively shows that the individual will be unable to
prove his class membership84 or that the employer had a viable and incon-
trovertible reason for its actions against that individual. 5 The court rea-
soned that named plaintiffs should not be expected to prove at the liability
stage factors which other claimants are not required to prove until the back
pay stage. The panel also ruled that claimants who elect to testify on the
liability issue should not be held to a more rigorous standard of proof on
their back pay claims than those not testifying." Because the evidence
adduced by the trial court did not fall into either of the categories that
sanction dismissal, the panel remanded the individual claims for consider-
ation during the back pay proceedings. 8
Although the Fourth Circuit has previously held that Title VII class
actions may proceed solely under Rule 23(b)(2),89 Sledge strongly encour-
ages district courts to adopt the bifurcated process when trying employ-
ment discrimination litigation. While the Fourth Circuit's decision does
not require lower courts to utilize the bifurcated trial procedure, ° the
Sledge panel's approval of rigorous claim filing requirements clearly indi-
cates that notice should be given in back pay proceedings." The Fourth
Circuit's procedural approach in Sledge is in accordance with recent Su-
preme Court directives requiring strict compliance with the requirements
of Rule 23 in Title VII class actions.2
or promotions for which the claimant qualifies. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
at 773 n.32.
"2 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973). "Mere pretense"
would be found if white applicants were assigned the job in question even though their
qualifications were only equal to or even inferior to those of the minority applicant. 585 F.2d
at 637.





Id. The district court judge in Sledge stated in his opinion that whenever named
plaintiffs testify, they should give some testimony that substantiates the charges of discrimi-
nation. Id. at 638. Most of the plaintiffs in Sledge merely verified their employment records
and testified as to the authenticity of exhibits. Id. at 638 & n.26.
Id. at 643.
" See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir. 1971).
50 See 585 F.2d at 637; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LMGATION (CCH) § 4.12 (1973).
" 585 F.2d at 652-53; see note 78 supra.
'z See East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977).
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Upon concluding that Stevens had violated Title VII, the district court
instituted a broad remedial decree which included injunctive relief,9" rigid
racial quotas 4 and back pay awards." While expressly leaving unresolved
the permissibility of quotas under Title VII, 6 the Fourth Circuit reversed
the affirmative action portion of the remedial decree, holding that
"compelling circumstances" must be present to invoke racial quotas.17 The
court held quotas inappropriate where effective relief99 for the aggrieved
,3 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,047, at 4877. The district court enjoined Stevens from engag-
ing in any employment practice which purposely or effectively discriminates against any
employee or job applicant on the basis of race. Id. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
" Id. at 4878-79. The district court directed Stevens to make bona fide offers of employ-
ment to an equal ratio of black and white applicants. Id. at 4787. The remedial decree further
mandated that blacks and whites be assigned in equal proportion to fill weaving and clerical
vacancies until forty percent of the employees in those departments are black. Id. at 4878-
79. Once Stevens meets this requirement in the clerical department, it must make bona fide
assignment offers to an equal ratio to blacks and whites for two years. Id. at 4879. Other high
paying jobs which the district court found had been reserved for whites, see note 14 supra,
were to be filled by an equal ratio of blacks and whites until blacks held a third of those jobs.
Id.
Quotas are defined as "mandatory percentages of minority employment representation."
30 CONG. Q. 3092 (Dec. 2, 1972). While the district court termed its racially preferatory
remedial provisions "ratios", see 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,047, at 4878, semantical distinc-
tions have no bearing on the issues raised by racial and ethnic classifications. See Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978).
11 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,585, at 6439. The district court held that conditions later
promulgated by the court would govern individual back pay awards. Id.; see note 78 supra.
,1 585 F.2d at 646-47. While the Fourth Circuit has never imposed racial quotas, a
majority of other circuits have expressly approved their use as a remedy for racial discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
910 (1975); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 377 (8th Cir. 1973). Subsequent
to the Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), most courts considering the issue of quotas have held that the Bakke decision
allows quotas when used to remedy judicial or legislative findings of discrimination. See, e.g.,
Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1294 (5th Cir. 1978). Contra, Associated Gen. Contractors
v. Secretary of Commerce, 459 F. Supp. 766, 780 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (rigid racial quotas are
unconstitutional after Bakke).
The plaintiffs in Sledge contended that the Fourth Circuit approved the use of racial
quotas in Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 273-74 (4th Cir. 1976). Brief for
Plaintiff at 57, Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978). In Sledge, however,
the panel made it clear that the plaintiff's reading of Patterson was too broad and that the
issue is still open in the circuit. 585 F.2d at 646 n.34; see White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp.,
564 F.2d 1073, 1091 (4th Cir. 1977). Recently the Fourth Circuit held that Bakke permits
racial preferences upon a finding of statutory violation so long as third parties are not preju-
diced by the preferences adopted. See Uzzell v. Friday, 591 F.2d 997, 1000 (4th Cir. 1979)
(en banc).
,7 585 F.2d at 646-47. The Sledge court did not define "compelling circumstances", but
implied that such circumstances would be present if the employer's discrimination was fla-
grant and quotas were the only effective means of redressing this discrimination. Id. at 647.
See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 277 (4th Cir. 1976) (Widener, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("exaggerated facts" must be present for imposition of remedial
quotas).
"8 The Sledge panel emphasized that in considering whether quotas should be imposed
as elements of a comprehensive remedial decree, "nothing less than 'the most relief possible'
under the circumstances would fulfill that obligation." 585 F.2d at 664; see Franks v. Bowman
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plaintiffs can be achieved through less racially-conscious means99 or where
an employer has made substantial and convincing progress since the effec-
tive date of Title VII1°° in eradicating the effects of discriminatory employ-
ment practices. 10 Furthermore, district courts should not impose racially
preferential relief if the discrimination sought to be remedied has not been
"egregious, purposeful, or blatant."'0 2
In Sledge, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
Stevens' employment practices were neither intentionally nor overtly dis-
criminatory"0 3 and concluded that the racial discrimination involved was
not egregious.' The court noted that during the pendency of the litigation
the racial disparities in both hiring and promotions had been almost to-
tally eliminated.0 5 In light of these factors and because other parts of the
remedial decree directly addressed the causes of the illegal discrimina-
tion, ' the court held that effective remedial relief was possible without
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976). See also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975).
11 585 F.2d at 647; see Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 1136 (4th Cir. 1973) (quotas not
imposed because effective relief afforded by injunctive provisions alone); cf. United States v.
City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 437 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (quotas
imposed because defendant's reluctance to adopt voluntary measures made them only effec-
tive relief possible).
10 Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352 § 716(b).
10*1 585 F.2d at 646-47; see Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 275 (4th
Cir. 1976) (defendant's recent appointments of qualified blacks and women to supervisory
positions at rate exceeding their ratio in work force sufficient to deny imposition of quotas).
102 585 F.2d at 647; see, e.g., Kirkland v. New York St. Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520
F.2d 420, 427 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (limited scope of challenged
employment practice coupled with defendant's good faith sufficient to demonstrate the ab-
sence of egregious discrimination).
The Second Circuit considers an additional factor, not adopted in Sledge, in deciding
whether racial quotas are appropriate. If the effects of the affirmative action will be concen-
trated on a small, easily identifiable group of persons rather than spread among an unidentifi-
able group of potential applicants, racial quotas may not be imposed. See EEOC v. Local
638, Sheet Metal Wkrs., 532 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, in the Second Circuit, quotas
may be imposed with regard to hiring procedures but may not be prescribed for promotions.
See Kirkland v. New York St. Dep't. of Corrections Serv., 520 F.2d at 429; Local 35, IBEW
v. City of Hartford, 462 F. Supp. 1271, 1281 (D. Conn. 1978).
101 585 F.2d at 647. While the absence of discriminatory purpose is significant in design-
ing a remedial decree, it is not a defense to a disparate impact action. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); see note 24 supra.
101 585 F.2d at 647.
105 Id. at 648. During the years 1972-75, 50% of the new employees hired were black,
raising the total number of blacks in Stevens' workforce to 37.1% as compared with 19.4% in
1970. Id. Between 1967 and 1972, blacks were promoted by Stevens in four of its Roanoke
Rapids plants in higher percentages than whites were promoted. The percentage of blacks
promoted was lower than the number of whites promoted in two plants. Id. at 649.
'01 Stevens' failure to post job vacancies, its policy of relying upon the subjective conclu-
sions of white officials and its failure to establish objective hiring guidelines caused the
disproportionate rejection of blacks in Sledge. 585 F.2d at 648. These policies coupled with
Stevens' practice of reserving its better jobs for whites were responsible for the dispropor-
tionate promotion rate of blacks. Id. at 649. The remedial decree requires the defendant to
exhaustively post job vacancies and develop objective hiring and promotional criteria. 12
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imposing quotas. 07 The district court's ability to monitor compliance with
the remedial decree'08 was also an important factor in the Fourth Circuit's
decision to deny racially preferential relief.'0 ' The court noted that if the
prescribed relief does not fully eliminate the discriminatory impact of
Stevens' policies, the district court can modify the decree or even impose
quotas if "compelling circumstances" become apparent."
The Fourth Circuit's refusal to prescribe quotas except in exigent cir-
cumstances is consistent with Supreme Court directives that remedial
decrees should not exceed the bounds of fundamental fairness"' and with
holdings in other circuits."' Quotas should be limited to situations in
which no alternative relief would be effective since they penalize innocent
parties in the process of increasing employment opportunities for protected
classes."' By outlining the factors to be considered before prescribing reme-
dial quotas,"' the Fourth Circuit has provided the district courts with a
workable, analytical framework which insures that remedial decrees will
render the least possible harm to innocent third parties.
In addition to striking racial quotas from the remedial decree, the
Sledge panel further modified the decree by lengthening the back pay
liability period." 5 The court held that the district court erred in limiting
the potential back pay liability of Stevens to a period commencing three
years prior to the filing of the class action."' Noting that the 1972 Amend-
Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,047, at 4877-78. Furthermore, the court enjoined the use of subjective
opinions of white supervisors in employment decisions and the reservation of job classifica-
tions for members of a certain race. See 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,585, at 6438, 6439.
,o 585 F.2d at 648-50.
,o See 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,047, at 4883. Retention of jurisdiction by a district court
to monitor compliance with that court's remedial decree is often employed in Title VII cases.
See, e.g., Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
854 (1973); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1383 (4th Cir. 1972).
In Sledge the district court appointed a Special Master to assist the court in monitoring
Stevens' compliance with the decree. 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,047, at 4883.
o1 585 F.2d at 649.
1I0 Id.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308 (1978); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 784-85 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
"2 See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Kirkland
v. New York St. Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420, 427 (2d Cir. 1975); NAACP v.
Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1974).
"I See NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1974); Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957
(1974). In addition to adversely affecting whites, racial quotas tend to reinforce prejudices
confirming perceived differences between races. Id. at 18. Moreover, racial preferences for
members of one minority group might result in discrimination against other minorities. Id.
See generally Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations: Three Di-
mensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERs L. REv. 675 (1974).
" 585 F.2d at 647; see text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
"s 585 F.2d at 650-51. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the defendant's monetary liability
should extend back to September 5, 1966, which is three years prior to the filing of administra-
tive charges with the EEOC. Id. at 650. Under the district court's ruling, Stevens liability
for back pay would have begun on October 2, 1967. Id.
"6 Id. at 650.
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ments to Title VII" 7 were inapplicable because Sledge was filed prior to
their effective date,"8 the panel held that the state statute of limitations
governs potential back pay liability."9 The panel further noted that other
courts uniformly have held such statutes to be tolled from the filing of
administrative charges with the EEOC'20 rather than from the date of the
filing of the class action.'2 '
The Sledge panel also struck the "bumping" provisions from the reme-
dial decree.' 2 The panel reversed the district court's order that Stevens
institute a system whereby a black employee in one department scheduled
for layoff may displace an employee in another department with less plant
seniority, as long as the black employee can perform his new job with
reasonable training. '2 Noting that the circuits agree that Title VII does not
require an employer to demote white workers, 2 the panel reasoned that
the bumping provisions would penalize white workers and potentially
harm other victims of past discrimination, as one black employee may
"bump" another.'1 Additionally, the court concluded, the bumping provi-
sions would require significant alteration of a seniority system that does
not violate Title VII.'2' While the court expressly left open the question of
whether bona fide seniority systems may ever be altered in a remedial
decree,'2 it held that where other portions of the decree adequately redress
the condemned discrimination, legislatively protected seniority systems
should remain unchanged.'1 The panel concluded that, on the facts of
Sledge, allowing black employees to retain their seniority upon transferring
from one department to another adequately insulates them from layoffs.' 29
The Fourth Circuit's holdings in Sledge accord with the Supreme
"7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The 1972 Amendments to Title VII became effective on March
24, 1972. Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 14. These
amendments expressly limit liability for back pay under Title VII to two years prior to the
filing of the EEOC charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Where the EEOC administrative
investigation reveals evidence of a type of discrimination not alleged in the charge, the
employer's back pay liability for that discrimination should be measured from the time the
employer received notice of the results of the investigation rather than from the filing of the
charge. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 276 (4th Cir. 1976); accord, EEOC
v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1976).
,, 585 F.2d at 651; see note 100 supra.
"' 585 F.2d at 651.
' See note 1 supra.
2 585 F.2d at 651; see, e.g., EEOC v. Enterprise Assoc. Steamfitters Local No. 638, 542
F.2d 579, 590 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Georgia Power
Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925 (5th Cir. 1973).
"1 585 F.2d at 651-52.
123 Id.
12 Id.; see, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 267 (4th Cir. 1976);
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 316 (6th Cir. 1975).




In Id.; see 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 111,047, at 4879-81.
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Court's employment discrimination holdings' 0 and the legislative purpose
of Title VII.131 Congress, in enacting Title VII, sought to achieve equality
in employment by removing artificial barriers that prevent blacks from
achieving economic success.'32 In order for Title VII to be effective, how-
ever, enforcement must come predominately from private plaintiffs.'1
Sledge's flexible interpretation of the disparate impact analysis makes it
easier for plaintiffs to establish liability.'34 While this easier liability stan-
dard encourages Title VII suits, Sledge ensures that defendants are pro-
tected from specious claims. 3 The Fourth Circuit's formal adoption of the
bifurcated class action process30 means that only those who were genuinely
injured by discriminatory employment practices will be compensated. Fur-
thermore, the Fourth Circuit's reservation of quotas for only compelling
circumstances enhances the personalized relief afforded by Title VII.'3
This flexible remedial posture encourages employers to mend their ways
and provide the equal employment opportunities that the authors of Title
VII envisioned. The Fourth Circuit's decision, therefore, adheres to proce-
dural necessities, while advancing Title VII's goal of eliminating employ-
ment discrimination.
WALTER D. KELLEY, JR.
B. Employee Pregnancies
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment.1
As a consequence of the expanding role of women in the work force,2 the
30 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
"I See 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (Congress' primary
concern in enacting Title VII was "the plight of the Negro in our economy"); 110 CoNG. REc.
7204 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark) (Congress was concerned that blacks be able to secure
jobs which have a future).
3I See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2728 (1979).
133 See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (private plain-
tiffs vindicate policies Congress considers of highest priority).
,1' See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
"s See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
'13 See text accompanying notes 89-92 supra.
131 585 F.2d at 646.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). Congress enacted Title VII to remove discrimi-
natory barriers which restrict equal employment opportunities. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farrah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (national origin); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 547 F.2d 897,
889-901 (7th Cir. 1978) (religion); DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th
Cir. 1978) (sex); Witherspoon v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 457 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir.
1972) (race). In addition to prohibiting employment discrimination against minority groups,
Title VII created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to help admin-
ister the provisions of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (1976).
2 Approximately five times as many mothers are working today as in 1950. See Simp-
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importance of Title Vii's prohibition of sex-based discrimination has in-
creased.3 Although sex discrimination is clearly illegal under Title VII,
the issue of employee pregnancies has generated much uncertainty among
courts.4 In the last decade, the Fourth Circuit has influenced the course of
employment practices law concerning sex discrimination claims.5 A recent
son, A Victory for Women, 11 Civ. RIGHTS DIGEST 12, 17 (Spring 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Victory].
3 Title VII sex discrimination adjudication has dealt with a wide spectrum of employ-
ment practices. See, e.g., EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 578 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978) (no
marriage rule); DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978) (salary dis-
crimination); Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977) (required use of husband's sur-
name); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (hair
length). For an analysis of the legislative history behind Title VII's sex discrimination provi-
sions, see generally Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 879-85 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Miller]; Comment, Sex Dis-
crimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 1968 DuKE L.J. 671, 672-79 [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination].
4 Compare Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1977) (invalidating com-
pany seniority policy as violative of Title VII) with General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 145-46 (1976) (sustaining disability plan under Title VII) and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (upholding disability plan as not violative of equal protection).
The uncertainties in the area of pregnancy-related employment discrimination may be
attributable to the stereotypes associated with female workers. Many commentators have
noted that the notion of women as temporary workers is reflected in the pregnancy discrimi-
nation cases. See, e.g., Erickson, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytical Approach, 5
WOMEN'S R. L. RPTR. 83, 86 (1974); Victory, supra note 2, at 12; Comment, Title VII: Are
Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 13 TULSA L. REv. 102 (1977). Following this reasoning,
the courts have denied women the much needed protection from discrimination in the con-
text of employment relations. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 158 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 562 F.2d 6, 7 (7th Cir. 1977)
(upholding disability plan excluding pregnancy from coverage); Madrid v. Board of Educ.,
429 F. Supp. 816, 817-18 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (pregnancy exclusion sustained).
The confusion surrounding pregnancy discrimination may be further attributable to the
absence of legislative history on the sex provisions of Title VII. The paucity of legislative
materials is explained by the fact that Congress incorporated the sex provisions into the
Civil Rights Act only one day before the House approved Title VII. See M. Hill, Sex Dis-
crimination Under Title VII and the Constitution: A Legal Analysis, 29 LABOR L.J. 570,
571 (1978) [hereinafter cited as M. Hill]. Commentators have suggested that the sex dis-
crimination provisions of Title VII had been proposed by critics of the Act who believed the
incorporation could defeat the Bill. See Sex Discrimination, supra note 3, at 676. Further-
more, the sex provision met little opposition due to the undesirability of delaying the pas-
sage of the Act. See Miller, supra note 3, at 877, 879-85. Without the guidance of the
legislative materials, Congress' intent could be misconstrued. See generally Davie, Preg-
nancy, A Laborious Issue, 7 HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (Fall 1978) [hereinafter cited as Davie];
Comment, Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employment: The Impact of General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 13 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 717 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Differential Treatment].
Much of the uncertainty surrounding the relationship between pregnancy related em-
ployment practices and sex discrimination will be clarified by a recent amendment to Title
VII. See Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (to be codified as 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). See generally Blackman, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 16 GA.
ST. B.J. 43 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Pregnancy Discrimination]. See text accompanying
note 63 infra.
5 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 587 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 48
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Fourth Circuit opinion, Mitchell v. Board of Trustees,6 exemplifies the
attempt by the judiciary to develop a workable standard for determining
which employment practices involving employee pregnancies are sexually
discriminatory.
Mitchell, a high school Spanish teacher in Pickens County, South Car-
olina, signed a letter of intent to renew her contract for the upcoming
year.7 Soon after signing, Mitchell discovered that she was pregnant.8
Complying with school district regulations, Mitchell gave notice of her
pregnancy to the school board.9 As a result of the pregnancy notice, her
employment contract was not renewed. 10
Mitchell challenged the pregnancy notice requirement on constitu-
tional grounds in federal district court." Her objection to the school pol-
icy was based on the fact that pregnancy was the only condition that trig-
gered the mandatory notification requirement. 1 2 Since only women
become pregnant, Mitchell maintained that the school board policy dis-
criminated on the basis of sex. Mitchell claimed that the school officials
used the information required of the pregnant female teachers as a basis
for declining to renew employment contracts.' 3
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant
school board." Mitchell appealed the judgment and simultaneously filed
a Title VII suit in the district court based essentially on the original
U.S.L.W. 3356 (1979) (mandatory pregnancy notification policy); Gilbert v. General Elec.
Co., 519 F.2d 661, 668 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (disability plan excluding
pregnancy disabilities); Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir.
1973) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)
(mandatory maternity leave policy). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th
Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (race discrimination decision presenting analytic
framework used in adjudication of sex discrimination claims).
8 599 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1979).
7 Id. at 584.
a Id.
I Id. Upon discovery of pregnancy, the school board regulation required the pregnant
woman to apply for termination of her contract. Although subject to exceptions, the regula-
tion provided that termination should occur at least three months before the anticipated
delivery date. Id. at 584 n.1.
10 Id. at 584. Although the regulation applied only to the termination of contracts, the
Fourth Circuit treated the non-renewal as termination by noting the similar consequences of
such actions. Id. at 584 n.1. The school board rescinded the regulation during the litigation.
Id.
11 Id. at 584. Mitchell based her constitutional challenge on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
Section 1983 recognizes a cause of action when a person deprives another of any rights,
privileges or immunities provided by the Constitution. Id.
12 Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 415 F. Supp. 512, 514 (D.S.C. 1976).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 584. The lower court granted summary judgment on the authority of Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc). In Cohen, the
Fourth Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to a school's mandatory leave policy which
required pregnant teachers to terminate employment by the fifth month of pregnancy. Id. at
396. The Fourth Circuit held that the policy served a legitimate and reasonable state inter-
est by promoting the continuity of the educational system. Id. at 399.
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claim. 5 Relying on recent Supreme Court authority, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the constitutional decision and remanded the suit to the district
court.' The district court consolidated both claims and focused primarily
on the Title VII challenge.'
7
Finding for plaintiff Mitchell, the district court relied on the Fourth
Circuit opinion of Gilbert v. General Electric Co.' 8 and concluded that
the school board policy had a discriminatory effect on women."9 During
the pendency of the plaintiff's appeal, however, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Gilbert decision.20 Consequently, the district court withdrew
judgment for Mitchell in light of the Supreme Court reversal.2' Mitchell
then filed the present appeal.2 '
The Fourth Circuit utilized a disparate impact analysis to find the
school board's mandatory notice requirement prima facie violative of Ti-
tle VII.2 s Although the policy was facially nondiscriminatory in its treat-
ment of the sexes,' 4 the Fourth Circuit determined that, in effect, the
Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1979). Mitchell complied
with the requisite EEOC procedures before filing the Title VII suit. Mitchell v. Board of
Trustees, 415 F. Supp. 512, 516 (D.S.C. 1976). The procedures for a Title VII challenge are
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). Initially, the complainant-employee files a charge
with the EEOC alleging the existence of an unlawful employment practice. Within ten days,
the EEOC serves notice of the charge on the employer, and conducts an investigation. If the
EEOC determines that an unlawful employment practice exists, the EEOC will attempt to
eliminate the practice through arbitration. The plaintiff may file a civil action upon failure
of the EEOC to secure an agreement.
16 Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1979). The Fourth Circuit
vacated the Mitchell summary judgment after the Supreme Court reversed the Cohen deci-
sion sub nom. in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). See note 14 supra.
In LaFleur, the Supreme Court held the challenged school regulation violative of due pro-
cess since the maternity leave policy unduly restricted the teacher's freedom to bear chil-
dren. Id. at 639.
'7 Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 415 F. Supp. 512, 514 (D.S.C. 1976); see Mitchell v.
Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1979).
18 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
'9 Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 415 F. Supp. at 517-18; see Mitchell v. Board of Trust-
ee8, 599 F.2d 582, 584; General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
20 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
2 Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1979).
22 Id. Subsequent to the filing of the Mitchell appeal, the Supreme Court decided
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). See Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d
582, 586-87 (4th Cir. 1979); text accompanying notes 42-53 infra.
23 Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 586-87 (4th Cir. 1979). The Supreme
Court originally formulated the disparate impact doctrine in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971). Under a disparate impact analysis, a facially nondiscriminatory em-
ployment policy is deemed prima facie violative of Title VII if the policy's effects are dis-
criminatory in nature. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (disparate
impact applied in weight and height requirement challenge). A discriminatory motive need
not be proven under a disparate impact analysis. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47
(1976). But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976) (implying the necessity
to prove intent under § 703(a)(1) of Title VII).
24 In adopting the District Court's finding of facial neutrality, the Fourth Circuit cau-
tiously observed that the determination hinged on the court's identification of the chal-
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regulation imposed a hardship only on female teachers.2 5 As a result, the
court reversed the district court judgment for the school board and re-
manded the case for consideration of any business necessity defense that
the defendants might assert.
26
Mitchell, like other Title VII sex-related employment discrimination
cases, involved section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27 Subsection
one of section 703(a) declares unlawful any employment practice which
discriminates on the basis of an individual's sex.28 A violation of subsec-
tion two of section 703(a) occurs when an employment practice restricts
employment opportunities or affects an employee's status because of the
worker's sex.
29
Two recent Supreme Court opinions interpreting section 703(a), Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert80 and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,31 illustrate
the difficulties faced by the judiciary in developing a workable standard
for adjudicating pregnancy discrimination cases under Title VII. Gilbert
involved a section 703(a)(1) challenge to an employee disability plan. The
plaintiffs alleged that the policy discriminated on the basis of sex, since
the plan provided nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits but ex-
cluded from coverage disabilities resulting from pregnancy.2 Relying pri-
marily on the dictates of a prior constitutional decision, s the Supreme
lenged policy. Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 585 n.4 (4th Cir. 1979). Although
realizing that the pregnancy notification requirement lacked neutrality for disparate impact
analysis, the Mitchell court accepted the lower court's focus on the school's unwritten policy
of contract non-renewal where a teacher could not assure a full year's service. Id. at 584-85.
25 Id. at 586-87.
28 Id. at 588. Under a disparate impact analysis, an employer must demonstrate busi-
ness necessity for the implementation of a discriminatory policy. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). To satisfy the business necessity test, an employer must show
more than a mere business purpose behind a discriminatory policy. See id. (manifest rela-
tion to employment); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798, cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 954 (1971) (necessary to safe and efficient operation of business); 29
C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1979) (EEOC Guideline).
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976); see Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 583
(4th Cir. 1979).
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
9 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
30 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
31 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
32 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1976).
33 Id. at 132-40. The Supreme Court based the Gilbert decision on Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to
California's disability program which excluded from coverage certain pregnancy-related dis-
abilities. Id. at 486. In refusing to consider pregnancy as a sex-based classification, the Court
deemed the exclusion rationally supportable by the state's legitimate interest in the pro-
gram's fiscal integrity. Id. at 495-96. The applicability of Geduldig to the Gilbert case is
questionable since the Supreme Court decided Geduldig within a constitutional equal pro-
tection analysis requiring a different standard for adjudication than the statutory claim
presented in Gilbert. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
Under a constitutional analysis, a discriminatory policy is unassailable so long as there
is a reasonable basis for drawing distinctions among classes of individuals. See Geduldig v.
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Court held that the plan's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities did
not violate Title VII.
34
Within a disparate impact framework,3 5 the Court viewed the disabil-
ity plan as facially neutral in its treatment of the sexes.36 Refusing to
recognize differential disability coverage of pregnancy as a distinction
based on sex, the Court maintained that the employee plan merely distin-
guished between pregnant women and non-pregnant persons.3 7 Moreover,
the Court rejected the claim that the facially neutral policy had a dis-
criminatory effect.3 8
The Gilbert decision appeared to conflict with a trend promoting Title
VII protection for female workers.3 9 The Supreme Court's subsequent de-
cision in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,40 however, determined that Gilbert
limits but does not eliminate Title VII's applicability to pregnancy re-
lated discrimination.
4'
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, a company employee brought suit
under Title VII challenging the validity of the company's sick pay and
seniority policies. The plaintiff maintained that the company sexually
discriminated against female employees by excluding pregnancy absences
from reimbursement under the employee sick leave policy.4 2 The Su-
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974). A stricter standard, however, controls the statutory analysis
under Title VII. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 137-40. Within a statutory framework, a policy which has
a disparate impact upon a group is prima facie violative of Title VII. A court will sustain the
policy only if the defendant can establish business necessity for its implementation. Id. See
Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 587 (4th Cir. 1979); note 26 supra.
In Gilbert, the incorporation of the constitutional standard of Geduldig within the
traditional statutory analysis caused confusion in deciding what standard determines the
outcome of Title VII adjudications. See Differential Treatment, supra note 4, at 720 n.9.
Such confusion is evident in Mitchell since the Fourth Circuit decided to remand the case
for a hearing on the business necessity defense in view of the School Board's and lower
court's mistaken reliance on a constitutionally oriented legitimate state interest standard.
Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 587-88 (4th Cir. 1979). See note 26 supra. See
generally M. Hill, supra note 4, at 579-81; Comment, Sex Discrimination-Distinctions
Between Title VII and Equal Protection-General Electric- Co. v. Gilbert, 31 RUTGERS L.
Rav. 91, 100-05 (1978); Comment, Proving Discriminatory Intent From a Facially Neutral
Decision With a Disproportionate Impact, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109 (1979).
3' General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
" See notes 23 & 26 supra.
3' General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976); see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); note 62 infra.
37 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139-40 (1976).
38 Id. at 138. The court found the policy to be lacking in discriminatory effect since the
plaintiffs failed to prove the plan more valuable to men than women. Id.
3" Gilbert came as a surprise to many observers because, prior to the decision, distinc-
tions based on pregnancy were seen as violative of Title VII. See Victory, supra note 2, at
16, 19; Barkett, Purpose, Effect, and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 16 J. FAM. L. 401, 413
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Purpose, Effect]. Eighteen federal district courts and seven fed-
eral courts of appeals have held pregnancy-based employment discrimination violative of
Title VII. See Somers v. Aldine Independent School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900, 902 (S.D. Tex.
1979).
40 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
41 See Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 586-87 (4th Cir. 1979).
41 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 138 (1977).
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preme Court sustained the policy under section 703(a)(1) by finding the
company's program "legally indistinguishable" from the disability plan
upheld in Gilbert.4 3 In challenging the seniority policy, the plaintiff as-
serted that the company practice adversely affected the job status of fe-
male employees in violation of Title VII.4 4 Under the challenged policy,
the pregnant plaintiff on maternity leave lost any seniority accrued before
her leave of absence.45 The employee did not regain her previously accu-
mulated seniority upon return to work and, thus, became disadvantaged
when competing for future positions.
46
The Supreme Court employed a disparate impact analysis to hold the
company seniority policy prima facie violative of section 703(a)(2). 47 The
Court conceded that the policy was facially neutral since both men and
women retained seniority while on leave for reasons other than preg-
nancy.4s However, the Satty Court deemed the policy violative of Title
VII because the company deprived female employees of job opportunities
without placing similar restraints on male workers.
49
The Supreme Court in Gilbert and Satty failed to develop a workable
rule for handling Title VII pregnancy-related claims.50 At best, these
opinions demonstrate that courts may sustain disability programs exclud-
ing pregnant employees while holding seniority policies that treat for-
merly pregnant employees differently than other workers violative of Ti-
tle VII. Although the Satty Court attempted to distinguish the two
employment practices, the Court did not construct a clear and rational
distinction.51
13 Id. at 143.
" Id. at 138.
' Id. at 138-39.
16 Id. Rather than return to work without any accumulated seniority, the petitioner in
Satty found it more advantageous to quit in order to draw unemployment compensation. Id.
47 See notes 23 & 26 supra.
48 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140 (1977). The policy's neutrality is ques-
tionable since the denial of accumulated seniority has only been applied in the context of
maternity leave. See id. at 140 n.2. Justice Powell, concurring in the result and concurring in
part, would not assume the policy's facial neutrality. Id. at 152 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 141-43.
10 See Differential Treatment, supra note 4, at 742 ("jurisprudential gymnastics"
needed to reconcile Satty and Gilbert decisions). One commentator has suggested that the
Court's ineptness is due to the fact that the judiciary is the least equipped of the govern-
mental branches to deal with the pregnancy issue. See Purpose, Effect, supra note 39, at
406.
" Justice Stevens suggested that the distinction between the holdings might hinge on
the effects of the policies on the female employees. Stevens proposed that some discrimina-
tion would be permissible during the employee's maternity absence. Discriminatory policies,
however, are invalid if their effects extend beyond the duration of the leave period. Nash-
ville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 155 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
The Court may have been concerned with the economic implications of their holdings.
See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1976); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.
1971); Comment, Sex Discrimination-Satty Narrows Gilbert-Some Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation is Sex Related, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 295, 317-18 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Satty
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In attempting to reconcile the decisions, the Supreme Court in Satty
distinguished the challenged policies by postulating a benefit-burden dis-
tinction between employment practices involving female employees.
5 2
While viewing the disability plans as merely precluding the extension of
greater fringe benefits to women, the Court deemed the seniority policy
violative of Title VII since the denial of accumulated seniority proved
burdensome to female workers by limiting the availability of employment
opportunities.5 s
The Satty Court implied that the applicability of sections 703(a)(1) or
(a) (2) might be outcome determinative in sex-based employment discrim-
ination cases. The Court stated that the disability plan challenge would
be more appropriate under section 703(a)(1) due to the difficulty of prov-
ing that the exclusion of disability benefits restricted the employment
status of the complainant-employee. 5' Under such an approach, the Gil-
bert analysis becomes relevant to section 703(a)(1) actions, while section
703(a)(2) directly applies to Satty-type restrictions on employment op-
portunities. This distinction becomes crucial to the outcome of the Satty
decision since the Court implied that intent to discriminate, as opposed
to mere proof of discriminatory effect, might be necessary to invalidate an
employment policy under section 703(a)(1). 55
After reviewing the Supreme Court's decisions, the Fourth Circuit
found the mandatory notification policy in Mitchell more analogous to
the seniority policy struck down in Satty than to the disability plan up-
held in Gilbert.5" Satty was more relevant to the Mitchell determination
because both the school board policy and the seniority challenge effec-
Narrows Gilbert]; Differential Treatment, supra note 4, at 740-42. A decision requiring em-
ployee disability plans to include sick pay benefits for women on maternity leave could
prove to be excessively expensive for the company concerned. The economic consequences
of the elimination of mandatory notification and termination policies, however, could be
minimal. Some commentators have suggested that the impetus behind the Satty court's
rejection of the seniority policy rested with the policy's inequitable effects on pregnant em-
ployees. See Differential Treatment, supra note 4, at 740-41; Purpose, Effect, supra note
39, at 474 n.285.
:2 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1977).
3 Id. The Satty court's benefit-burden distinction has been criticized as unworkable
since the imposition of an employment policy may be burdensome to one class of persons
and at the same time beneficial to another. See id. at 154 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Consequently, the decision provides no guideline as to whether the court will view a chal-
lenged policy as beneficial or burdensome. As a result, much uncertainty will surround the
outcome of pregnancy discrimination controversies since the Court's characterization of the
policy could be outcome determinative. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4751; Differential Treatment, supra
note 4, at 717, 728, 738, 747 n.122, 748. Comment, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty: Pregnancy
Classification in Employers [sic] Seniority Policy Amounts to Sex Discrimination, 5 OHIo
N.U. L. REV. 506, 509-12 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Pregnancy Classification].
54 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1977).
51 See id. at 144; General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976). The implied
adoption of an intent standard in dealing with 703(a)(1), as opposed to the disparate effect
guidelines of 703(a)(2), can be traced to the court's controversial adherence to the constitu-
tional analysis of Geduldig. See note 33 supra.
56 Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 586-87 (4th Cir. 1979).
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tively burdened the employment status of women. 57 As a result, the
Mitchell court ruled section 703(a)(2) applicable to the plaintiff's case.58
By reinforcing the Satty Court's apparent divergence from a broad
Gilbert rule, the Fourth Circuit in Mitchell further promoted Title VI's
purpose in eliminating employment discrimination 9 with minimal intru-
sion into the operability of the school system. 0 The curtailment of
Mitchell-like school policies will have no adverse economic or educational
consequences outweighing the increased job security for women teachers
resulting from the eradication of the discriminatory employment practice.
Although the Mitchell decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's
Satty opinion, the Fourth Circuit did not provide a workable standard for
handling Title VII claims." This inadequacy reflects the court's conform-
ity with the questionable distinctions made by the Supreme Court when
dealing with the relationship between pregnancy related employment pol-
icies and sex discrimination under Title VII.6 2 Constrained by the availa-
57 Id.
11 Id. Section 703(a)(1) appears equally applicable for determining the validity of the
pregnancy notification requirement since the policy arguably discriminates against female
teachers with respect to the terms of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). If so, the
Mitchell challenge illustrates the unworkable distinction made by the Supreme Court be-
tween §§ 703(a)(1) & 703(a)(2). See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
19 See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1972).
60 Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 415 F. Supp. 512, 518 (D.S.C. 1976); see Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641-42 (1974). In Mitchell, the plaintiff gave school offi-
cials seven months advance notice of her anticipated leave of absence and arranged for a
substitute teacher to replace her for that period. 415 F. Supp. at 518.
61 Although Mitchell does not reveal a workable standard, the Fourth Circuit ruled
consistently with the economic trends in sex discrimination cases, since the invalidation of
the school policy will bring about little or no fiscal pressure on the school budget. See note
51 supra.
62 See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 125, 136, 138-40 (1976); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). The judiciary has stubbornly adhered to the view that
pregnancy is a voluntary condition which is not a medical disability. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at
136. The Court has steadfastly maintained that distinctions based on pregnancy involve
condition-related, rather than sex-based, discrimination. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
The Court has viewed pregnancy distinctions as merely differentiating between pregnant
and non-pregnant persons in spite of the administrative guidelines on Title VII's sex dis-
crimination provisions provided by the EEOC. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-40; Geduldig,
417 U.S. at 496-97; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.10 (1979). These administrative regulations indicate
that pregnancy-related employment distinctions are sex discriminatory in nature. See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1979). Although Congress has not delegated authority to the EEOC to
promulgate rules or regulations, all circuits are in agreement that the Guidelines are entitled
to great deference. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 147 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (Brennan summary of circuit cases); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433
(1971). The Gilbert Court's failure to follow the Guidelines because of alleged inconsisten-
cies contained within various EEOC pronouncements created an uncertainty concerning the
proper weight the judiciary is to accord the policy statements. See General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976). However, the Supreme Court in Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty reaffirmed the deference owed to the EEOC interpretations. See Nashville Gas Co.
v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977); Pregnancy Classification, supra note 53, at 510-
12; Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (to be codified as 42 U.S.C.
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ble precedent, the Fourth Circuit merely classified another employment
practice within the Supreme Court's Gilbert-Satty framework.
Realizing the uncertainty surrounding the judicial treatment of preg-
nancy discrimination claims, Congress has amended Title VII to make
clear that sex discrimination, as delineated in section 703(a), encompasses
all employment distinctions based on pregnancy."3 The amendment, com-
monly referred to as "K", provides a much needed and workable guide-
line which will simplify the identification and termination of sex-based
discriminatory practices.6 "K" will help alleviate the arbitrary line-draw-
ing and unpredictability which characterizes the most recent Court opin-
ions dealing with the rights of women employees by making discrimina-
tion based on pregnancy a per se violation of Title VII. 5
Under amendment "K", the outcome of the Mitchell case would be
affirmed since "K" makes clear that pregnant women must be treated the
same as non-pregnant persons in the employment context. The
mandatory notification requirement and the contract termination policy
would be found prima facie violative of Title VII. As a result, amendment
"K" will shorten the "meandering course"66 of Title VII pregnancy dis-
crimination adjudication 7 as exemplified by the seven years of 'see-saw'
litigation in Mitchell v. Board of Trustees.
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§ 2000e(k) (adopting the EEOC Guidelines). The Guidelines are applicable in the instant
case to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII since the school board's policy excluded
Mitchell from employment because of her pregnancy. See 29 C.F.R. 1604.10(a), (b) (1979).
" The new amendment, Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(to be codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)), provides that:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of ben-
efits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected to but similar
in their ability or inability to work. Id. § 2000e(k).
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4749, 4750. The amendment will affect women taking maternity leave on or after
April 29, 1979. See generally Pregnancy Discrimination, supra note 4, at 43; Davie, supra
note 4; Victory, supra note 2, at 12.
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4751.
5 Id.
6 See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 148 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the
result and concurring in part).
'7 See, "e.g., Somers v. Aldine Independent School Dist. 464 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Tex.
1979) (amendment "K" used to summarily invalidate maternity policy requiring pregnant
employees to take mandatory leave following first trimester of pregnancy).
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